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THE PROPER LAW OF THE CONTRACT*

M

ORE than any other branch of the law, the science of

Conflict of Laws lends itself to a fruitful study from a
comparative point of view.' For though its character is that
of municipal law, it tends to find the most practical solutions
in cases where a clash of two different systems of law seems
unavoidable. Rigid national principles are scarce and the
science seems altogether unorthodox. Within existing systems of Conflict of Laws, it is the principle of the law governing contracts which is open to the greatest number of
diverse solutions. This, because of the fact that contracts,

more than any other legal institution, are less static than
dynamic. Moreover, they are created by the free will of the
parties. Thus, we believe, that a study of the solutions used
in a number of European countries might be of use to the

legal profession of the United States even though practice
and doctrine are far more established there than in Europe.
Conflict of Laws or Private International Law, as it is

more commonly called in Europe, has played the part of
Cinderella in the codifications of most European systems, and
* This article concerns itself with a comparative study of some aspects of
the Continental and Anglo-American Systems.
Note: The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to Professor
H. C. Gutteridge, LL.M., K.C., Fellow of Trinity Hall of the University of
Cambridge, under whose guidance this material was gathered during a seminar
on the subject Lent Term 1938 at the University of Cambridge.

'See

KuHN,

COMPARATIVE

COMMENTARIES

ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

LAW; 4 FICKyE, REcHTSVERGLEicHENDES HANDWOERTERBUCH (1933) 371-390.
It is impossible to enter into the question of the relation between international law and conflict of laws. Reference may be made to the discussion by
Arminjon (1928) (I) REc. DES CouRs 433-509; (1929) REvuE De DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE

680-98 and a forthcoming article by Dr.

Lipstein containing a full bibliography. We regard the attempt to find the
basis of a system of conflict of laws in the conception of sovereignty as unfortunate; for either it means nothing more than that every state may introduce
such rules of conflict of laws as it thinks fit. Or it may mean that every
system of laws has to respect the sovereignty of other systems. Though this
may be adequate (but not theoretically sound) in situations wholly connected
with one territory, it fails to fulfill its task in cases connected with several
systems of law. For what is the meaning of "respecting sovereignty"? Does
it mean the universal recognition of the lex patriae (so Zitelmann, Frankenstein, Pillet) the lex domicilii (so v. Bar), or the lex loci contractus?
No answer can be given here; but it may be pointed out that it ends in a
dispute upon questions of a priori.
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within the few systems that have attempted a codification of
it, the rules governing contracts have often been consciously
omitted. Thus we find detailed rules only in the Austrian
aGBB 2 and the parts of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
which formerly belonged to the old Austrian Empire, in addition to Italy 3 and Poland. 4 In France, Germany and Switzerland the matter has been left to the courts as in the case
of England and the United States. But as the role of precedent in Europe is a different one from that in the Common
Law of England, case law has not been quite successful in
introducing undisputed rules. For precedents are not binding upon any but the highest courts and even these are empowered to overrule their own precedents under certain conditions. This power is, of course, also exercised by AngloAmerican courts but so rarely as not to seriously shake the
ruling power of case precedents. In practice, however, European case law does establish a certain continuity, if only for
the reason that inferior courts are reluctant to contradict
cases decided by the supreme courts for fear of being overruled and thus to hamper the chances of promotion of the
judges concerned.5 On the whole we may therefore say that
a certain practice has been established, but exceptions exist
and there is always a certain chance of being able to criticize,
attack and finally bring about a change in this sphere of no
man's land.
Writers have been only too willing to accept this task,
and during the past forty years an immense literature has
sprung up. Of recent text-book writers who have not limited
themselves to a descriptive discussion we have 'to mention
Arminjon, Niboyet, Frankenstein, Nolde, Sauser-Hall, Jeanpr~tre and Haudek 6 who have brought into bold relief the
24, 34-37.

'Art. 9, § 2. disp. rel. c.c.; art. 58, c. comm. (1933).
'Arts. 7-10, Statute of 2.8.1926.
' The career of judges, on the continent of Europe, is distinct from that of
other professional lawyers. After having completed their course of education,
they have to decide whether they intend to go to the Bar or to the Bench, where
they start as Assistant Judges, both in Regional and County Courts.
'2 ARMINJON, PRECIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (2d ed. 1934)
231 sq.; NIeoyET, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (2d ed. 1928)
789 sq. no. 681; (1927) (I) REC. DES CouRs 1-12; 2 FRANKENSTEIN, INTERNATIONALES

Lois

PRIVATRECET (1929)

123 sq. no.; JEANPETRE, LES CONFLITS DE

EN MATIERE D'OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES SELON LA JURISPRUDENCE ET
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problem as it exists on the Continent. In England the influence of Story, the great American jurist, has, during the last
century, largely been replaced by the work of the late
Professor Dicey, but of late the writings and teachings of
Professor H. C. Gutteridge and Dr. G. C. Cheshire 7 have
been well received by scholars and practitioners alike. American legal thought on the subject, initiated by Judge Story,
is now best represented by the work of Professors Beale,
Lorenzen and Cook.8 Before expressing the views and tendencies outlined by these writers, it seems advisable to touch
on the position of the law as it stands today.
The French Code Civile does not contain any pertinent
provisions but the courts have taken a steady course and a
well established "jurisprudence" (case law) 9 enables us to
draw definite conclusions.'" The governing principle is that
of autonomy of will, i.e., of free choice of law by the parties."
However, it happens, and not only occasionally, that the
parties have omitted to express their intention. It is then
that canons of interpretation come into play. First, the judge
is called upon to investigate whether a tacit reference to any
system of law places that contract under the rules of that
system.'2 Failing this, he has to apply certain tests, whether
(1936) ; HAUDEK, DIE BEDEUTUNG DES PARTEIWILLENS IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1931); SAUSER-HALL, ZEITSCHRIFT FUER SCHWEIZERISCHES (1925)
271a-320a; ,Nolde, A47tloaire de
LA DOCTRINE AUX ESTATS-UNIS

l'Itstitut de Droit International (1925) (32) 50-145, 501-508; (1927 (I) id.
at 937-954; (II) id. at 194-225, 336.
' Professor H. C. Gutteridge (1936) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 19; DR. G. C.
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1938) 241 et seq.
'BEALE, A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1936); BEALE, CASES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1909); LORENZEN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS; LORENZEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTEs (1919).

' Precedent, in continental Europe, as we have stated above, does not carry
the same weight as in Anglo-American law. Binding upon the supreme courts,
but subject to overruling by a special form of judgment by the full court, it is
only of persuasive authority with regard to inferior courts. The latter are not
bound by their own previous decisions.
"0This would nbt appear so from the attitude taken by text-book Writers
who attempt to introduce their own solution into the existing law.
'Cass. req. 28.12 (1936); (1937) REV. CeiT. 684, with note by Battifol;
Cass. civ. 31.5 (1 9 3 2 )1 (1934) REV. CRIT. 909, with note by Niboyet; Cass.
civ. 12.5 (1930); (1931) Clunet 164; cf. (1930) Clunet 417. See also Cass.
civ. 5.12 (1910) ; Sirey (1911) 1, 129, with note by Lyon-Caen; (1911) REV.
DARRAS 395; Cass. req. 19.5 (1884); Sirey (1885)
1, 113, with note by
Lacointa; cf. HAUDEK, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 59.
"Battifol (1935) REV. CRIT. 629; Cour d'Appel of Colmar (1934) Clunet
976; Lyon-Caeon, Sirey (1911) 1, 130; Cass. req. 10, 12 (1907) ; Sirey (1910)
1, 132.
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as canons of interpretation or as objective tests cannot be
stated with any certainty. 3 These tests are as follows: (1) If
both parties are of the same nationality then the lex patria
or the law of -their nationality governs. If the parties are
domiciled in any other country than that of their nationality
then the law of their domicile governs. 14 (2) If the parties
are of different nationalities then the lexr loci contraotus or

the law of the place of contracting governs.15 (3) If the
place of contracting is difficult to ascertain then the law of
the place of performance will be applied.' 6 (4) Finally, the
court will apply that system which ,would uphold or look
7
with the greatest favor on the contract.'
Arminjon suggests a slight change in this order reversing the position of tests numbers two and three. Moreover,
he suggests that in the case of test number three the lew
patria, of the debtor should supercede the lex solutionis, the

law of the place of performance, provided it is a unilateral
contract.' 8 These contentions, however, have not found much
favor in the decided cases.
"See Niboyet (1936) REv. CRIT. 464.
" Cf. Lyon-Caen, note to Sirey (1911) 1, 129, and to (1900) 1, 161,
quoting many older cases. See Cass. req. 19.5 (1894); Sirey (1885) 1, 113;
Cour d'Appel, Douai 2_11 (1933); Sirey (1934) 2, 109 (2).
'sCour d'Appel, Colmar, 162 (1937); (1937) REv. CRIT. 687, with note by
Battifol; cf. note to Sirey (1913) 4. See Cass. req. 28.12 (1936) ; (1937) REv.
CRIT. 684; Cass. civ. 15.5 (1935) ; (1936) REv. CRIT. 464; Battifol (1937) REv.
CRIT. (1937) 434; Cass. civ. 31.5 (1931); (1934)
REv. CRIT. 911; Sirey
(1933) 1, 17, with note by Niboyet; Cass. civ. 15.12 (1910) ; Sirey (1911) 1,
129; (1911) REv. DARRAs 395; Cass. civ. 6.2 (1900); Sirey (1900) 1, 161;
Cour d'Appel, Paris, 25.6 (1931); (1932) Clunet 933 (5); Cour d'Appel,
Colmar, 11.3 (1933); (1934) REv. CRIT. 138; Cour d'Appel, Douai, 2.11
(1933) ; Sirey (1934) 2, 109 (regarding it as the presumed intention of the
parties, contrary to the well established doctrine of the Cour de Cassation).
See also Colmar 17.2 (1937) ; Battifol (1934) REv. CRiT. 639/40.
I( Decisions favouring the lex loci solutionis are gaining ground. Cour
d'Appel, Paris, 26.3 (1936); (1936) REv. CIT. 487; Battifol (1937) REv.
CRIT. 435; Cass. civ. 31.5 (1932); (1934) REv. CRrr. 909; Cour d'Appel, Paris,
28.2 (1935); (1935) REv. CRIT. 748, with note; Cour d'Appel, Metz, 12.4
(1934); (1935) Clunet 988 (the court purports to interpret the intention of
the parties) ; Gour d'Appel, Colmar (Belfort) 2.5 (1933) ; (1934) Clunet 424;
(1934) REv. CRIT. 163; Battifol (1935) REv. CRIT. 631. But cf. Colmar, 30.1
and 13.3 (1933); (1934) Clunet 951; BATTrroL, op. sapra note 12, at 630
(where the court was unable to locate the place of execution of the contract).
17 WEISS, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (9th ed. 1925) 571 sq.;
2 ARMINJoN, op,. cit. supra note 6, at 248 sq. No cases can be quoted in
favour of this proposition.
'2 ARmiNJON, op .cit .supra note 6, at 250.
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In Switzerland the law governing the essential validity
of contracts has been summed up in the following words by
the Tribunal Federal, the highest court of that country, in a
recent case:
"Following a long line of decisions of the Tribunal
Federal concerning the essential validity of contracts,
we hold that that system of law is applicable which
the parties intended submission to when the contract
was concluded or lacking an express declaration, that
system of law which they would have intended to
apply if they had considered this question at all. The
system of this presumed intention is the system of
that country with which the contract in question has
the closest local connection." 19
The Swiss courts then, we can say, attempt to find the proper
law of the contract-that law which is most closely connected
with the contract. It is interesting to note that this has
usually been held to be the law of the place of performance
of the contract.2 0 In cases where the places of performance
are situated in more than one country, and one of the places
happens to be Swiss, then Swiss law will be applied. 2 1 In the
case of a unilateral contract the law governing will be held
to be the law of the debtor's domicile. In the same manner
when a Swiss firm enters into a type of contract known as a
"massenvertraege" or a "contrad' adhesion"-a standard contract by one debtor with a large number of creditors in
various countries, the law of the debtor's domicile is applied,
i.e., the Swiss law.2 2 In the event the court is unable to find
" Arret du Tribunal Federal, Receuil officiel (A. T. F.) 40-11-391 and
63-11-307. But free choice of law exists only at the time the contract is
concluded. It does not go so far as to allow the parties to state, during the
litigation, that they intended to apply Swiss law when the circumstances of
the case point to a different system. The declaration by the parties during the
case to apply a certain system of law not specified in the contract can serve
only as an indication to the judge of what they intended when entering into
the contract. But this presumption or guide is in no way binding upon the
judge. A. T. F. 63-11-44; A. T. F. 62-11-125; A. T. F. 60-11-300.
n A. T. F. 63-11-308.
"'A. T. F. 57-11-72.
=A. T. F. 44-11-432.
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the "proper law of the contract", then it will apply the lea;
fori or the law of the forum.2 3
Contracts concluded in Czechoslovakia between nationals and foreigners are governed by Czech law even if the
contract is to be performed in a foreign country or the debtor
is a foreigner.24 The same system of law, i.e., the lea loci
contractus, is applied even though the contract is between
foreigners, if the contract has been concluded in Czechoslovakia. However, foreigners have the option of stipulating, in
their contract, that another system of law is to apply and
this choice is binding on the Czech courts. They are limited
in their choice to a system of law which has some connection
with the contract.2- Although on the Continent it is the general rule that the law of a man's nationality follows him
wherever he goes, Czech law permits its citizens autonomy
of will in making contracts outside of Czechoslovakia. This
permission extends not only to a Czech and a foreigner but
to two Czechs contracting in a foreign land. However, if the
contract is to be performed in Czechoslovakia then Czech law
will be applied. 26 Where two foreigners conclude a contract
in a foreign land to be performed in Czechoslovakia they are
permitted a free choice of the law governing
that agreement.
2
These rules apply to Austria as wellY.
According to Italian law, contracts are governed by the
lea loci contractusbut if the parties are of the same nationality then by their lea patria. But it is always open to the
28
parties to prove a different choice of law.
The Polish Statute of 1926 provides an infinite variety
of rules. The parties are free to choose for their contract one
of the following systems: the lea patria, the lea domicilii, the
lea loci contractus, the lea loci solutionis, or the lea res
sitae.29 Lacking a choice by the parties, the following system
A. T. F. 44-11-492.
OBCANSKY ZAKOHNIr

Ibid.

(Czech Code) § 36.

Supra note 24, § 4.
Supra note 24, § 35. Unilateral contracts concluded by foreigners, being
the debtors, are governed by Czech law or by the law of the nationality of-the
foreigners, depending upon which law is more favorable to the contract.
Art. 9, § 2, disp. prel. c.c.; Art. 58, c. comm. UDINA, 6 REPERTOIRE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 510-12.
"Art. 7, Statute of 2.8 (1926); cf. Makarov. in Leske-Loewenfeld: 8
DIE RECHTSVERFOLUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN VERRKYEHR (1929) 145 sq. no.
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is applicable: in contracts referring to stock exchange and
other markets, the law governing the market concerned; as
to land, the lem res sitae; for retail commerce, the law of the
residence of the vendor; all insurance contracts, the law governing the insurance company; professional contracts, the
law where the profession is exercised; labor contracts generally, the law of the place where the labor was done." In
all other contracts not mentioned above: if the parties are
domiciled in the same country, the law of the domicile; if
not domiciled in the same country, then the law of the debtor's domicile in the case of unilateral contracts; in the case
of bilateral contracts, or if the domicile of the debtor is
unknown, the lew loci contractus. For the purpose of this
statute the lear loci contractws is the law of that place where
3
the offeror receives the acceptance. 1
More general rules, in this respect, are applied in Germany. In the first instance, the principle of free choice of
law by the parties is recognized.3 2 However, this does not
mean that the parties may choose any law they may desire.
A decision of the Reichsgericht, the highest court of the country, handed down in 1895, before the introduction of the new
code of 1900, but which is still regarded as authority today,
held that a marriage brokerage contract between two domiciled Saxons, executed and performed in Saxony, could not
be submitted by the parties to the law of Prussia.3

3

It is

therefore suggested that the parties may choose the system
of law they desire only so far as their contract has a certain
connection with the system chosen.
In case the court is unable to find an expressed intention
in the contract it has to look for a tacit one. Lacking this,
'Id. art. 8.
'Id.
art. 9.
'E.g., Gz. 145, 121 (1934); IPR. RSPR. (1934) n. 29; 1. W. 3121 (1935)
33; BuL.. INST. JUR. INT. 71, no. 8792; (1935) REv. CRIT. 447, with note by
Mezger surveying the cases; RGZ. IPR. RSPR. (1934) n. 19; RGZ. 142. 417,
23; (1933) n. 21; (1931) nn. 30-32; (1930) nn. 30-31, 40, 48; (1929) nn.
31, 36, 43. It must suffice to refer to these cases and to LEWALD, DAS
DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT nos. 260-268, 10; REPERTOIRE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 71, n. 5; 73, n." 12; HAUDEK, Op. cit. supra note 6, with
numerous quotations at 47, n. 2.
' RGZ. 44, 300; LEWALD, Op. cit. mcpra, at 212, n. 269; 10 REP. 79, n. 39.
' See supra note 32; RGZ. IPR. RsPR. (1930) nn. 32-33, 34; RGZ. 126, 196

(1929) n. 45. LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32, at 212, n. 269; 221, n. 276; 10
REP. 74-75, nn. 14-17 and the cases quoted there.
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the court is entitled to find the intention of the parties from
the circumstances of the case and what system of law the
parties would have chosen if they had ever considered the
matter.3 4 In addition the court may, in the last instance,
apply the test of the lew loci soluionis-thelaw of the place
of performance.3 It is difficult to say when and how the
courts apply one or the other of these tests, as it is nearly
always possible to construe a fictitious intention and find
that intention to be the lex loci solutionig.31 It may be stated
with some confidence that they are applied vicariously and
that the lew loci solutionis is used as the last resort.
It is universally agreed that the English rule with respect to the essential validity of a contract calls for the application of the proper law of the contract. This, according to
Professor Dicey's Rule 155, is the rule that governs, and he
states it to be: "The proper law [of the contract] is the law
by which the parties to a contract intend the contract to be
governed, or the law or laws to which the parties intended to
submit themselves."
The English courts have paid, and still continue to pay,
great deference to the authority of Dicey, but no case has yet
arisen wherein there was an express intention that a specific
system of law should apply, with the possible exception of
the case of the Torni,3 7 but this is a doubtful case at best.
Inevitably the courts are forced to deduce a presumed intention. This, of course, is really an objective test. Cheshire
and Westlake 38 both contend that the courts adopt the objective test in every instance and therefore reject Dicey's theory
39
of the proper law.
In attempting to find this proper law of the contract the
courts have availed themselves of a number of rebuttable presumptions. The first of these presumptions is the lem loci
contraxtus or the law of the place where the contract was
'See spra note 32; RGz. IPR. Rsrm (1932) n. 27; (1930) nn. 30, 31;
(1929) nn. 33, 37, 38, 47, 48, 49; LEwALv, op. cit. supra note 32, at 224, n. 281,
with references.
" See'LwAL, loc. cit. supra note 32.
1THE ToRNI (1932) Probate 27 at 78.
' CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 249 et seq.; WESTLAYm,
PRi(7th ed. Bentwich) 299 et seq.
. DICEY, CONFLICT op LAWS (5th ed. Keith) Rule 155 at 647 et seq. and
958 et seq.
vATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
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made. This is always indulged in when the contract is to be
performed where it was made or where no place of performance is specified.4" If, on the other hand, the agreement
between the parties is to be performed at a place other than
that of the making, the presumption is that the law of the
place of performance was intended by the parties. 4 1 Thirdly,
and this is a very rare case, where, in the case of maritime
contracts, specific reference is made by the parties to the law
of the flag of the ship as the governing rule, a court will
adopt that law as conforming with the intent of the contract42
ing parties.
Although throughout the numerous jurisdictions that
comprise the United States, support can be found for almost
every doctrine concerning the law governing the essential
validity of contracts, it seems to be widely held, if in fact it
is not the majority rule, as stated by Corpus Juris: "A contract is governed as to its intrinsic validity and effect by the
law with reference to which the parties intended, or fairly
may have presumed to have intended, to contract, the real
place of the contract being a matter of mutual intention except in exceptional circumstances evincing a purpose in making the contract to commit a fraud on the law.' 43 "The
intention of the parties may be either expressed or implied
from their acts and conduct at the time of making the contract." 44 However, express provisions as to the law they
desire to govern their contract must be made in good faith by
45
the parties or the court will not give effect to them.
When construing this intent, the American courts have
usually presumed, when no further statement was made, that
the law of the place of contracting was intended by the parties because of the fact that they made their contract in that
place, or, as it has been put, the contract is governed by the
lexr loci contractus unless a contrary intent appears to have
been in the minds of the parties.
' P. & 0. v. Shand (1865) 3 Moo P. C. (Ni. s.) 272.
"Chatonay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. (1891) 1 Q. B. 79;
Benain v. Debono (1924) A. C. 514.
4"Lloyd v. Gilbert (1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. 115.
,813 C. J. 277, § 19 et seq.
"Bertonneau v. Southern Pacific Co., 17 Cal. App. 439, 120 Pac. 53 (1911).
"2 BEALE, Op. cit. su pra note 8, § 332.23 et seq.
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However, where the contract is made in one country or
place, to be performed, wholly or in part, in another place,
be prethe proper law, particularly as to performance, 4may
6
sumed to be the law of the place of performance.
Neither of these main presumptions is, as to the leading rules, conclusive as to the intention of the parties but
they are important indicia of that fact.4 7 Professor Beale
does not see the intention of the parties as the basis of the
law which ought govern contracts. His interpretation of the
American cases does not place the intention of the parties
as the leading rule. Considerable may be said for that opinion as it is often very difficult to find out, from the mere
reading of a case, whether the judge applied the tex loci
contractus as a rigid rule, or found that rule to have been
intended by the parties. 48 It is sufficient to say, however,
that rigid rules are applied in some of the states of the Union
and the question of whether the rule which seeks to find the
intention of the parties or one which lays down an unalterable legal principle is the leading rule is merely an academic
quibble. A discussion of the relative merits of the two opposing camps is, however, imperative, and is dealt with in
detail below.
CAPACITY.

In French law, capacity to enter into contractual relations is governed by the lew patria, or the law of the nationality of the contracting parties, according to the statutory provisions of Article 3, Section 3 of the Code Civile. To this is
added the reservation that a foreigner dealing with French
citizens in France cannot avail himself of his incapacity if
the Frenchman acted in good faith
he acted fraudulently and
49
and with due caution.
" Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCune, 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup.
Ct. 220 (1911); Am. Spirits Mfg. Co. v. Albany, 164 Ill. 186, 45 N. E. 442
(1896) ; Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154 (1891) ; Doughery v.
Equitable Life Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 171, 193 N. E. 897 (1891); Old Dominion
Copper Mining Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193 (1909).
'Mayer v. Rochw., 15 A. 235.
"2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 332.53 et seq.
"de Lizardi v. Chaise, Cass. req. 16.1 (1861) ; Sirey (1861) 1, 305, with
note by Mass&; Lyon, 30.4 (1907) ; (1908) Clunet 146; (1908) REv. DARRAS
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Likewise in Swiss Law, the question of contractual
capacity is governed by the 1ex patria. But foreigners, capable according to Swiss Law, cannot claim exemption
afforded them by their national law. 50 This is also the rule
according to the law of Germany."'
In accord with the general rule of the Continent as exampled above, the law of Czechoslovakia applies the lex
of capacity of foreigners to
patria concerning the question
52
contract in Czechoslovakia.
Capacity, in Italy, is also governed by the Ie= patria
with the reservation that the law of the place of making the
contract shall govern commercial contracts.5 3 In Poland the
lex pactria is always applied.5 4
The Anglo-American common law here makes a rather
sharp break with the Continental tendency and refuses to
recognize the doctrine of a personal law following a man
wherever he may go. In England, Dicey supported the view
that the law of the domicile of the parties should govern, but
made vital exceptions to that rule, particularly in the case of
mercantile contracts. In the case of these latter contracts,
all agree that the lex loci contractus must apply although
Dr. Cheshire would apply the proper law of the contract to
this phase of its validity as well. 55
There is little doubt that in the United States the capacity of the parties to make a contract is, as a general rule, to
be determined by the law of the place where the contract is
entered into.5 6 However, the law of the place of making the
capacity, if it is
contract will not be given effect, as regards
57
forum.
the
of
policy
public
the
to
contrary
630; Cassin (1930) (IV) REc. DES COURs 794, n. 94; NIBOYET, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 712, n. 600.
CODE CIVIL SUISSE, Title Final, art. 59; 12 a 14.
Id. art. 7, § 3 EGBGB; LEWALD, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 58, nn. 73-77,
with cases.
' Id. § 36. Where foreigners are incapable according to the law of their
nationality although this fact was not known to the other party, the contract
cannot be enforced but the innocent party has a claim for damages.
IDiN-A, 6 REP. DE DROIT INTERNATIoNAL 510, n. 127, quoting App. Milan
1.7 (1914); (1914) RIvIsTA Di DnIrro INTERNAZIONALE 610.
'Art. 1, Statute of 2.8 (1926).
CHESH E, op. cit. supra note 38, at 205 et seq.
'Mathews v. Murchison, 17 Fed. 760 (Cir. Ct. N. C. 1883); Union Nat.
Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538. 162 N. E. 672 (1902).
' Geneva First Nat. Bank v. Shan, 90 Tenn. 237, 59 L., R. A. 498.
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FORm.

In French law formalities are governed by the law of
the place where the transaction takes place.58 This is also
the rule in Swiss law. 59
But in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia the law
governing form is the proper law of the contract. Both countries, however, will recognize the formal validity of the contract if the lea loci contractus has been complied with. 0 In
Italy the rule prevailing is the locus regit actum-the place
where the act occurred-but if the parties are of the same
nationality it is sufficient that the leo patria of the parties
has been complied with. 1
Dr. Cheshire, in his recent work, appeals for the proper
law of the contract as governing with respect to form, but he
has no authority for that proposition.2 It is usually held to
be the English rule that the locus regit actum governs,
although no cases seem to exist on the question of the law
governing the formal validity of a contract, outside of marriage and revenue cases.
The American rule follows the general trend as stated
above.6 3 However, as respects formalities in the nature of
the Common Law Statute of Frauds, Professor Williston suggests that such requirements be considered a matter of validity instead of a requirement of procedure or evidence, since
the parties to a contract normally observe the formalities
required to make it enforceable in the place where they are
contracting. For if the Statute of Frauds is held to be a
procedural matter that is the concern of the lea, fori and as
we have stated it is invariably difficult and often impossible
to determine in advance what the forum
will be. The cases
64
are, on this point, somewhat divided.
'Cass. req. 19.5 (1884); Sirey (1885) 1, 113, with note (4) by Lacointa,
quoting many cases.
1A. T. F. 46-11-490.
'Art. 11, EGBGB art. 5, Statute of 2.8 (1926).
C'Art.
9 (1) disp. prel. c.c.
' CHESHRE, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 243.
" Roubicek v. Haddad, 5 L. A. 938.
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 600.
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REFERENCE TO MATERIAL PARTS OF FOREIGN SYSTEMS.

Not infrequently parties domiciled in the same country
and of the same nationality, making a contract to be performed at the domicile, happen to include in their contracts
some reference to a foreign system of law. This does not
mean that the system is now governed entirely by some foreign system of law wholly unconnected with the contract. In
fact it amounts to nothing more than that the parties, instead
of inserting as contractual provisions all those rules of that
foreign system in question, pertinent to their contract, have
taken the shorter course of referring to those rules as such.
A recent tendency to introduce such a limited choice of law
(libert6 des conventions) 6 r-limited to a defined set of foreign material rules has, however, been stopped by the Cour
de Cassation, the highest French court. 6 Thus it remains
open to the court to determine whether such contracts are to
be governed by municipal or foreign law.
The reference of the parties to some defined set of rules
of foreign law appears to exempt the contract altogether
from the sphere of the application of German law owing to
the wide discretion left to the parties and owing to the liberal interpretation of the parties' intention to subject the
contract to some other system of law. It appears therefore
that a libertd des conventions, such as proposed by French
and German lawyers, and as dismissed by French courts, will
only lead to the desired results if the parties refer expressly
to that limited part of the foreign system of law they wish to
apply as a contractual provision of their contract. They
must also express their wish not to take the contract out of
the system which would govern it but for the reference to
SARMINJON, op. cit. su~pra note 6, at 310 sq.; NiBOY-T (1927)
DES COURS 57.

(I) Rxc.

' HAUDEK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 41, n. 5, quotes; Cour d'Appel, Rennes,
16.7 (1926) ; (1927) Clunet 659; (1927) Rav. DARRAs 523; ca. Cass. civ. 19.2
(1930) ; (1931) Clunet 90; (1930) Rav. DARRAS 282; Limoges, 12.10 (1928) ;
(1929) Clunet 355; 3 JAHRBUCH FUER SCHIEDSGERICHTSWESEN 374; cf. Mann
(1937) (17) BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 101.
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some rules of foreign law.67 A slightly less rigid attitude is
taken in Switzerland, 68 Austria and Czechoslovakia.69
In England the parties may by reference incorporate
some part of foreign law into their contract, which as such,
will remain to be governed by the proper law. Thus in the

Dobetl v. Steamship Rossomore Co. case,70 a bill of lading

incorporated sections of the Harter Act by reference. Kay,
J., said, "This bill of lading must be read as if the words of
the Harter Act were set out at length in it." Also in Rowett
Leaky and Co. v. Scottish Provident Institution, 1 there were
policies which Astbury, J., declared to be an English contract
and construable by English law. The words "bona fide onerous holder" occurred and his Lordship said that he thought
expert evidence was admissible to show the precise meaning
of the phrase. He eventually decided the case by saying the
result was the same whether he looked at the evidence or not.
The words quoted above being a common usage in Scots law.
There is no reason why parties in the United States
cannot, instead of putting certain specific clauses in their
contract, merely refer to a foreign rule of law, if that rule is
not contrary to the public policy of the forum.7 2 This would
be true of course in states which permit the free choice of
law of the parties and those which seek to find the proper
law of the contract, but it should also be true in those states
applying a rigid rule, for the reason that what the parties
are really doing is inserting a particular clause in their contract which should be enforced as any other clause in the
contract is enforced.
RENVOI.
If choice of law is taken in the sense that it means nothing more than including into a contract, governed by a deZ57
HAUDEK, Op. cit. .supra note 6, at 49 and n. 1, 50; LEWALD, op. cit. supra
note 32, at 202-207, nn. 262-264; 10 REP. 72, nn. 6-9; RGZ. IPR. RSPR. (1933)
n. 21.
s HAUDEK, op. cit. .pra note 6, at 54, with quotations.
SHAUDEK, op. cit. supra note 6, n. 1, quoting OGH. 26.5 (1908); GIUNF

XI no. 4249.

oL. 895 2 Q. B. 403.
"42 T. L. R. 331.
See supra note 46.
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fined and unchangeable system of law, of references to a
substantially different set of rules of another system, instead
of providing for each separate case by special clause containing the material solution of the foreign system, the question
of renvoi cannot arise. For instance, the parties may feel
inclined to provide for the parting of the risk in a sale at a
time different from that provided in their own system. They
may define this in a number of provisions or they may refer
to a set of rules in another system of law which would comply
with their wish and would save them the trouble of reembodying all these provisions in the form of their contract.
In such a case the contract is not taken out of the system of
law governing it originally as decided by the law of the
forum. But when the parties decide to take the contract as a
whole out of that system, including its rules of municipal
conflict of laws and public policy upon which the latter insists in all contracts governed by it, then reference to the
foreign system of law does not differ at all from the reference
by that foreign municipal system of conflicts of law to still
another system. This means that we have to consider the
question of revoi.
Lewald states that he has only come across three cases
in German law dealing with this matter, and in all of them
renvoi is denied. No other system of law on the Continent
has been discovered by us to contain a similar case. 3 Prima
facie one feels inclined to say that if the parties did refer to
a system of law, they meant it, and did not consider that this
system could refuse to accept the reference to it.7 4 But does

this reason not hold as well when the law of the forum itself
prefers another system? Perhaps one may say that the parties, when referring to a foreign system of law, made that
selection because it was more convenient to them; if the law
refers to a foreign system, it does so for the sake of justice
and good administration, but it remains always in the background as a subsidiary system, only too willing to lend its
"At 206, n. 264: OLG. Colmar, 19.5 (1893); (1895) Clunet 141; 4 ZIR.
152; LG. Hamburg, 2.1 (1903); 14 ZIR. 82; 2.1 (1903); OLG. Braunschweig, 7.2 (1908) ; (1909) _Clunet 920; 16 OLG. RSPR. 362.
112 ARMINJON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 311-312, n.102;.NIBOrT (1927) (I)
REC. DES COuRs 58/61, whom Arminjon quotes in support of his opinion takes
a different view, starting from his conception of liberti des conventions."
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aid, as municipal law is always ready to be applied by municipal courts. The question of renvoi, in the law of contracts, is a comparatively new field, and many countries have
not had occasion, as yet, to deal with the matter.
In England a controversy, or rather an extreme doubt,
existed for some time as to whether or not the doctrine of
renvoi was a part of the common law. Four cases 76 give a
rather disputed and none too clear decision on the question. However, both Dr. Cheshire and the late Professor
Mendelsohn-Bartholdy held that the doctrine was not part
of English law. In the case of In re Ross, an English woman
who died domiciled in Italy leaving a will valid according to
Italian law but void as to English law, Luxmoore, J., held
that under English Private International Law the will was
good as the lec domiciiii must apply. This is the same result
that would have been reached had the doctrine of renvoi been
76
followed, but the court did not follow that line of reasoning.
In the case of In re Annesley 77 Russell, J., had a similar
situation of an English woman dying in France, having her
de fato domicile there. The court here did not accept the
remission to English law but applied what may be termed a
double renvoi and applied the law of the domicile-as a
French court would have done it. Although the doctrine of
renvol, being a part of English law, was not discussed, the
words of the judge do not leave the matter clear. However,
the other two cases clearly point out that renvoi is not a part
of English law and although the decisions since that time
have not been in perfect unanimity, writers are inclined to
agree that English law has not adopted the doctrine as a
78
ruling principle.
In America there seems to be a dearth of authority on
this point, with only two cases in the entire country cited on
the principle. The case of Harralv. Harrai79 does not seem
'In re Ross (1930) 1 Ch. 337; In re Anneseley (1926) Ch. 692; It re
Askew (1930) 2 Ch. 259; Collins v. Attorney-General (1931) 145 L. T. 551.
7' CHESHIRE, op. cit. .tpra note 38, at 45 et seq; BENDELSOHNN-BARTHOLDY,
RENVOI iN MoDERN ENGLISH LAw 67 et seq.
' See note 75, supra.
" See note 76, supra.
'39 N. J. Eq. 279 (1884).
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to be a real problem of renvroi. However, the case of
Carter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. not only discussed the
question, but the court held that a reference by the parties to
the law of New York (from Hawaii) included the whole of
the law-conflict of laws as well.80 No support seems to have
come for the principle laid down in this case although a thorough search of its subsequent history was beyond our power.
The objections against autonomy of will or free choice
of law by the parties is two-fold.8 ' Firstly, it can be said that
it is more than anomalous that instead of the law governing
the parties the parties should govern the law. In fact a choice
exercised without a system allowing the parties to do so is
an invalid attempt at a legislative act. But it may be said
with some confidence that there is always a system which
ex poste determines whether the parties could or could not
take their choice. This is the law of the forum which now
has jurisdiction over the case on some disputed point of the
contract. It may not be very satisfactory to have this question deferred until an actual dispute arises because it is
often impossible to determine in advance what the forum will
be. It is our opinion that one of the purposes of law is stability through certainty, which certainty cannot be had where
free choice is allowed. Secondly, there is a far more serious
objection to be dealt with. If the parties are free to take
their contract out of one system and to submit it to another,
they are empowered to avoid all those rules of municipal law
which parties contracting under this system are not entitled
to stipulate away.8 2 But then we find a new tendency outlined above to distinguish between absolute free choice of
law and libert6 des conventions. This is a sign that the courts
have become aware of a possible solution, namely, free choice
of law where the contract is connected with several systems
Carter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Hawaii 559 (1900). However, in the
case of In.re Talmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1919), the New
York court held that reference to another system of law did not include reference to its system of conflicts. See Lorenzen (1910) 10 CoL. L. REv. 190.
'12 FRANKENSTEIN, Op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 158; NIioYET, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 50-69; 2 ARMINJON, op. cit. spra note 6, at 253-262, nn. 78-80;
LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32, at 199-202, nn. 260-261; HAUDEK, Op. cit. supra
note 6, at 5-6, with references.
'HAUD.K,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 3; NIBOYET (1927) (I) REc. DES COURS

53-69.
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of law and libertM des conventions where only connected with
one system-connexion having a very wide meaning and
including every conceivable test. This, for the reason that
it is believed that the law is an institution for the convenience
of the parties and therefore that every possible convenience
and freedom be given the contracting parties. In the case,
therefore, of two Swiss contracting in London it should be
permissible for them to stipulate that Swiss law govern the
contract inasmuch as they are familiar with the provisions
of their own law. In the event of future litigation in the
83
English courts, Swiss law should be applied.
The lex loci contractus is likewise open to criticism. If
the contract is concluded between present parties, the rule
works smoothly. However, on the Continent, because of the
relative smallness of the countries and the great diversity as
to nationality and legal rules, this solution results very often
in a chance application of a system of law which has no interest in the parties or the subject matter of the contract. For
example: two Englishmen on a train traveling through Luxemborg conclude a contract concerning subject matter in
England. Under the above rule the contract would be governed according to the law of the place where it was made.
In the case of contract concluded between absent parties
(absentes) it is difficult to determine where the contract has
been concluded. A contract concluded by telephone between
a Swiss in Geneva, making the offer, and a Frenchman in
Paris, accepting the offer, is a contract between present
parties (presentes) in Swiss law, and absentes in French
law.84 The result is that, according to Swiss law, the residence of the acceptor is where the contract was concluded,
while, according to French law, the residence of the offeror
where the contract acceptance was received is the place of
the making. In the same manner if a contract were made,
by previous arrangement through the mail, between a man
in Tucson, Arizona, accepting an offer made by a man in
Frankfort, Germany, the contract would be concluded-acCf.

SCHNITZER, HANDBUCH

DES INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHTS

278-279;

op. cit. supra note 66, at 98.
aNIBoYT, op. cit. sutpra note 6, at 87-89; LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32,
at 223, n. 279; 2 ARMINJON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 267, n. 83; 2 FRANKENMANN,

STEIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 153-158.
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cording to the law of Arizona when the acceptor there posted
his acceptance, while under German law the contract would
not be made until the acceptance was received. The result is
that a different system of law will be applied depending on
where the action is brought. This solution, which might be
feasible in the case of common law jurisdictions, is unsatisfactory in Europe.
The lex loci solutionis has also come in for its share of
attack.85 It is again a question of classification (qualification) in the various countries which constitute the eventual
forum, coupled with the additional difficulty that even municipal systems are not always unequivocal as to what ought
be understood by the lexus executionisY'6 For example, a
contract is made in England for the sale of goods which are
to be delivered in several countries. Here performance takes
place in any number of places and it is impossible to determine the lex loci soluationis. Some courts have attempted to
solve this matter by using the place of the breach as the law
governing but there may be more than one breach and the
difficulty is still with us.8 7 In bilateral contracts the use of

this rule may lead to a splitting up of the contract 11 concerning which we shall have more to say below.
The lex patria is suggested, and in a number of places
actually applied.8 9 The number of its adherents is small, that
of its opponents great. 90 The foundation of this doctrine is
not empirical but rational. Zitelmann, arguing from the
point of view of international law, commands nationals
through the medium of their state to fulfill their obligations;
Frankenstein believes that, primarily, every person is connected only with his lex patri. It is not necessary here to
go further into this dispute between the national and inter' NInOYET, op. cit. supra note 6, at 89; LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32, at
224, nn. 281-285; 2 ARMINJON, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 268, n. 84; 2 FRANKIENSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 132-152; MANN, op. cit. supra note -, at 100 sq.
LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32, n. 285.
2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1089.
For in a bilateral contract we find two debtors.
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, Poland.
'To quote the most outstanding: 2 ZITELMANN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 366; PILLET, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, p. 441, n. 232; (1896)
Clunet 5 sq.; FRANKENSTEIN; ca.: e.g., NIBOYET, op. cit. supra note 6, at 85-86;
2 ARMINJON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 269, n. 85; LEWALD, op. Cit. supra note 32,
at 229, n. 256 (RGZ. 95-164) ; SCHNITZER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 276.
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national schools and further reference may be had in the
note. 91
Attaching the contract to the law of the debtor's domicile in cases other than unilateral contracts means again
splitting up the contract, but apart from that, the solution
is not altogether unsound when it coincides with either the
law of the place of making or performing the contract. It is
generally considered good legal advice to a client to sue his
debtor where he may be found. But this is open to the old
objection of rigidity and often being unconnected
with the
92
contract, as well as to classification of disputes.
To submit the contract to the municipal law of the
forum is a way out which can only be characterized as rough
and regrettable because it would be impossible to determine
9 3
where the plaintiff would bring his suit.
This leaves us to deal with proposals brought forward
by some of the writers which are not covered by the above
discussion. Arminjon, not satisfied with all the splits outlined above-capacity, form, essential validity, etc.-has
thought it advisable to suggest a further splitting up of the
contract into even more phases of possible litigation (entering into, avoiding, object of a contract, cause, invalidity,
nullity)..4
We adhere to the ideal of the French school, which, in
order to save the unity of the contract, deemed the free choice
of law by the parties the best method of obtaining that unity.
For this reason we cannot accept this proposal as it introduces unnecessary complications without increasing the certainty of the rule. Niboyet has offered a solution which up
to a certain point deserves serious consideration. First of
all he introduces definite tests similar to the Polish statute
' See above note la; Balladore-Pallieri

(1936)

(6)

RIviSTA DI DMlTTo

217-54; Ago (1934) (17) RIVlSTA DI DriTo INTERNAZIONALE 197232; (1936 (IV) REc. DES Couas 252-278; Gutzwiller (1934) (8) ZEITSCHarT
PRiVATO

FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 652; 4 MAKAROV,
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWOERTERBUCH 338. For an enumeration of older

writers and writings see: Potu (1913) Clunet 482.
LEWALD, op. cit. supra note 32, at 230, n. 287; SCHNITZER, op. cit. Mspra
note 32, at 277; 2 ARmINJON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 273; NIBOYET, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 86; Neumeyer (1925) (32) ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DRoiT
INTERNATIONAL 99-101; Cassin (1930) (IV) REc. DES CouRs 795, n. 95.
" NioYET, op. cit. supranote 6, at 84; SCHNITZER, op. cit. supra note 83, at
278; ca. 2 ARMINJON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 294, n. 92.

2 PExzis 291 sq.
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of 1926 9 discussed above; e.g., the sale of immovables to be
governed by the lex res sitae or the place where the thing is
situated; state contracts governed by the law of the state;
transactions on the stock exchanges and other markets by
the law governing such market; retail sales by the lex loci
contractus, etc.9 6 But once he has reached the stage of having
ascertained the law applicable he proceeds to add the privilege of libertM des conventions. Another rather imposing
objection to the suggestions of Professor Niboyet is that it is
almost impossible to determine, especially for a foreign lawyer, what rules of the municipal system of law involved may
be stipulated away and what rules may not be so stipulated
(or in other words what rules of that Continental system are
called droit imperatif and what are called droit sutperlatif). The solution advanced by the Polish statute has, however, much to be said in favor of it. It is an objective test
and avoids questions of classifications by making the rule of
law governing the case determinable by the proof of a fact,
e.g., the locale of the stock exchange, instead of making it a
question of law, e.g., as to what in the particular case might
be the lex loci solutionis. Such were the tests applied by the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which, like the Permanent Court of
International Justice, has no lex fo'ri to apply for classification purposes. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal applies the objective test in many cases 97 while the Permanent Court prefers to leave the choice entirely in the hands of the parties.
Those solutions appear, from one point of view, to be equally
advantageous as they offer a uniform system of law governing the contract as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS.

1. It is our belief that the first and most important step
in the solving of these intricate questions is through the me' See above 5a; see also INT. LAW ASSN. (1928), proposals cited by
NinoYET, op. cit. supra note 6, at 100, n. 1; Nolde (1927) (I) ANN. DE L'INST.
DE DROIT INT. 939.

(1927) (I) REC. DES COURS 91 sq.
7 E.g., RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MixTEs

2, 294;

3, 275; 3,800; 3, 380; 3, 365; 4,268; 4, 315; 4, 321, 82; 5, 168; 5, 349; 5.
779; 5, 14; 5, 1083; 6, 138; 6, 229; 6, 320; 6, 635; 6, 634; 6, 727; 7,
347; 7, 468; 7, 512.
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dium of international co-operation by means of convention.
This for the reason that such matters as the infinite variety
of public policies (orderpublique) and the rules which may
be stipulated away by the parties and those which may not
be (droit imperatif and droit superlatif) make it obvious
that some measure of compromise be effected for the purpose
of uniformity.9 7a Secondly, the law governing contracts lends
itself peculiarly to international convention because it contains few if any.of those elements of national policy, racial
and religious opinion, that have proved themselves to be insuperable barriers to international agreement in the matter
of marriage and divorce.9b
2. We believe that free choice of law by the parties is a
workable solution provided the system chosen has some connexion, however remote, with the circumstances of the case.
3. In case the parties have not exercised their freedom
of choice of law when making the contract, we submit that
the proper law of the contract should be applicable as a
purely objective test and not by the interpretation of the
intention of the parties. By the proper law of the contract
we mean that system of law which is most closely connected
with the contract. The convention might, if it saw fit, lay
down definite factual tests for the determination of the
proper law somewhat along the lines of the Polish statute
set out above.98
4. Formalities of the contract should be governed, in
our opinion, either by the law governing the contract or by
the le.c loci actu. If the provisions of either of these systems
were complied with, the contract should be regarded as formally valid.
5. The law governing the capacity of the parties to enter into a contract should be governed by the personal law
of the parties or by the law of the place where the transaction
took place. A man would therefore be capable of contracting,
if he were capable according to either of those two systems.
It is to be noted that no reference is made to the system
'a Arr. 14, p. 42; arr. 15, p. 121; cf. TAM 5, 200; 3, 1020.
In spite of the resignation expressed by the Institut de Droit International (1927) (III) ANNuAmR 336.
'b

"Id. at 5a.
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of law that should govern contract where an attempt at
rescission is made on the ground of fraud, error, etc., nor
have we discussed the question of illegality. These were conscious omissions as we felt them to be beyond the scope of
the present article. 9
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JEAN S. BRUNSOKVIG,
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At this point the American member must, however reluctantly, make
known his dissent from some of the conclusions of his eminent and learned
Continental colleagues.
It is his belief that free choice of law by the parties and the so-called
*proper law" are theoretically unsound and somewhat destructive in practice.
They allow the parties to perform a legislative act-make their own law-an
anomaly in the law. He believes that his colleagues have put the cart before
the horse and selected these solutions because of the fact that they make it
easier for the judge to settle the case. This ignores the fact that it is the
,purpose of law to prevent litigation, not to settle mitters easily after the
dispute has already come before the courts. Every case wherein a new rule
of law is laid down represents a failure of the law to perform its proper
function.
With respect to the "proper law" more particularly, his objection is that
it is difficult to determine what the proper law is and so counsel may never, with
confidence, say to his client what law will govern the prospective contract in
the event of suit. He never knows what the future forum will be and what
the judge of that forum will decide the proper law to be. This is far too
uncertain for practitioners; however, it may please academics.
The alternate solution with respect to form introduces two possible systems
governing an already complicated problem. An Englishman contracting with
a Czech who is incapable according to English law, must investigate the intricacies of Czech law to decide whether or not he may enter into a contract. Why
introduce the second system at all Is not the first the best from a commercial
and almost every point of view?
Besides the above objections, the dissentor finds himself in fundamental
disagreement with his fellows of the Continent on the question of Personal and
Territorial Sovereignty and the logical and legal bases of Conflict of Laws.
Discussions on this point, however, engendered such considerable heat and such
very little light that it was thought best to omit any discussion of the matter
and leave each reader to his own opinion.
The American member regrets exceedingly the necessity for this note, but
was encouraged to include it by his colleagues in this undertaking who, by force
of physical majority, controlled the thought of the textual conclusions and
recommendations. He therefore wishes to express his thanks to them for this
opportunity to touch on some of the views which he holds so strongly. He also
wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. G. G. Tilsley (LL.B., Birmingham)
for his invaluable aid in the preparation of the English law included in this
paper.
Editor's note: Inasmuch as the completed article arrived from Cambridge,
England while the rest of volume XII, number 2, of this review was at press,
it was impossible, in the time allowed, to edit the footnotes according to the
regular law review form.

